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Abstract
This paper studies dual money circulation within a model a` la
Lagos and Wright [18]. The main result of the analysis is the following.
In a dual currency circulation economy, (i) the money type with an
higher rate of growth circulates more widely than the money type
with a lower rate of growth, and (ii) the two monies are symmetrically
accepted if and only if they grow at the same rate.
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“A long-held notion is that an inferior currency should circulate more
widely than a superior money. Those holding both monies would
prefer spending the ‘bad’ money as soon as they can, and keep the
‘good’ money for future purchases,” [4].
1 Introduction
In many transitional economies, citizens may adopt a dual-payment system
by using the foreign currency – e.g. the dollar or the euro – in addition to
their own locally issued currency as a mean of exchange. In these countries
it is usually observed that the foreign currency is not universally accepted,
however, in the sense that the great majority of agents make use of the local
currency in transactions. This phenomenon rises the following questions.
First, under what conditions do the foreign and local currencies co-exist?
Second, when is the local currency more widely accepted than the foreign
currency and why? Third, what is the role of monetary policy in each case?
The focus of this paper is to address these questions within a third-generation
search-theoretic model of money.
Search-theoretic models of monetary economics have become the dom-
inant framework to study dual currency circulation as they formalize the
essential role of money explicitly, rather than assuming it exogenously. The
search literature on multiple currencies includes, to cite a few, [1], [7], [8],
[12], [21], [23], and [25]. All these papers share the assumption that money is
indivisible, and individual holdings of money are bounded at one unit (first-
and second-generation models). An exhaustive survey of these models is
in [5]. Some attempts to study multiple-money holdings in a two-currency
framework are [4], [6], and [10]. In [4], agents are allowed to hold two units
of indivisible money. [10] relax the restriction of money indivisibility, but
they assume that goods are indivisible. In their paper, [6] derive numerical
results within a divisible-money divisible-good model.
This paper studies the links between monetary policy and dual currency
circulation by extending Lagos and Wright [18] (hereafter, LW) to two curren-
cies and imperfect information. The LW framework is useful because allows
one to derive analytical results while keeping the distribution of money hold-
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ings tractable (third-generation models). Imperfect information opens the
door to restrictions on which medium of exchange must be used for payment
in goods trade. This is because, for instance, money types can be counterfeit
and not all agents can recognize counterfeits from authentic monies, so they
will never accept some money types. Other works assume that financial as-
sets ([14], [16, 17] and [19]) and capital goods ([15]) can be used with money
as competing media of exchange.
There are a number of papers that are closely related to the present work
(i.e. [9], [11], and [20]). They also study two-currency issues within a third-
generation model of money, but never consider the role of information.
The main result of the paper is the following. In a dual currency circu-
lation economy, (i) the local money circulates more widely than the foreign
money, and (ii) local and foreign monies are symmetrically accepted if and
only if they grow at the same rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework
and the agents’ decision problem. Stationary equilibria are characterized in
Section 3. Section 4 introduces imperfect information. Section 5 derives
conditions for endogenous acceptability. The conclusions end the paper.
2 The model
The basic setup is borrowed from LW. Time is indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, ...,∞}
and each period t is divided into two subperiods where different activities
take place. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents and two
types of perfectly divisible commodities – general and special goods. Each
agent produces a subset and consumes a different subset of the special goods.
Specialization is modeled as follows. In the first subperiod, each agent meets
someone who produces a good he wishes to consume with probability σ ∈
R (0, 1/2] and meets someone who likes the good he produces with the same
probability σ. With probability 1 − 2σ an agent has no opportunity to
trade. Let us denote consumers as buyers and producers as sellers. The
specialization of agents over consumption and production of the special good
gives rise to a ‘double coincidence of wants’ problem. In contrast to special
goods, general goods can be consumed and produced by all agents.
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Special goods can only be produced during the first subperiod, while
general commodities can only be produced during the second subperiod. In
the first subperiod, agents participate in a decentralized market (DM) where
each meeting is bilateral and is a random draw from the set of pairwise
meetings. In this market the terms of trade are determined by bargaining.
In the second subperiod agents produce general goods and can trade in a
centralized market (CM).
Agents get utility u (q) from q consumption in the DM, where u′ (q) > 0,
u′′ (q) < 0, u′ (0) =∞, u′ (∞) = 0, and u (0) = 0. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the elasticity of utility e (q) = qu′ (q) /u (q) is bounded. Producers incur
utility cost c (q) from producing q units of output with c′ (q) > 0, c′′ (q) ≥ 0,
and c (0) = 0. Let q∗ denote the solution to u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗).
In the CM all agents consume and produce, getting utility U (x) from x
consumption, with U ′ (x) > 0 , U ′ (0) = ∞, U ′ (∞) = 0, U ′′ (x) ≤ 0 and
U (0) = 0. Let x∗ be the solution to U ′ (x∗) = 1. All agents can produce
consumption goods from labor using a linear technology. Agents discount
between the CM and the next-period DM, but not between DM and CM.
This is not restrictive since as in [22] all that matters is the total discounting
between one period and the next. It is assumed that individual actions are
not observable in the CM so as to avoid contagion equilibria (see [2, 3]).
All agents are anonymous in the DM. Consequently, trade credit is ruled
out and transactions are subject to a quid pro quo restriction so there is a
role for a medium of exchange ([13] and [24]).
At the beginning of a period, the expected steady state lifetime utility of
the representative agent is
(1− β)W = σ [u (q)− c (q)] + U (x)− x (1)
where β ∈ R (0, 1) is the discount factor and q the quantity of goods con-
sumed by a buyer and produced as a seller in the DM. The solution to the
planner problem in an economy without anonymity yields
U ′ (x∗) = 1, (2)
u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗) . (3)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could force agents
to produce and consume.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
There are two types j ∈ {1, 2} of durable and intrinsically useless objects:
money 1 and money 2. It is assumed that two independent central banks
exist that control the supply of each money type at any time t, Mj,t > 0.
It is also assumed that Mj,t = γjMj,t−1, where γj > 0 is constant and new
money of type j is injected, or withdrawn if γj < 1, as lump-sum transfers
pijMj,t−1 = (γj − 1)Mj,t−1 to all agents. The analysis will be restricted to
policies where γj ≥ β. The time subscript t is omitted and shorten t + 1 to
+1, etc. in what follows. Let us introduce the following:
Notation 1 If money 1 grows more quickly than money 2 (i.e. γ1 > γ2),
then money 1 is referred to as the ‘local’ money and money 2 as ‘foreign’
money, and vice versa.
The timing of events is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the DM,
bilateral trade of goods begins. In the CM agents receive lump sum transfers,
produce, consume and rebalance their money holdings. The structure of this
economy is shown in Figure 2.
At time t, let φj = 1/Pj be the real price of money j and Pj the price of
goods in term of money j in the CM. The focus is on symmetric steady state
equilibria, where aggregate real money balances are constant over time, i.e.
φjMj = φj,−1Mj,−1 (4)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} , which implies that φj,−1/φj = Mj/Mj,−1 = γj; the Fisher equa-
tion holds, hence it is equivalent to set the nominal interest or inflation.
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Figure 2: Environment
3 Stationary equilibria
Consider a symmetric stationary equilibrium. Let V (m) denote the expected
value from trading in the DM with a portfolio m ≡ (m1,m2) of monies. Let
W (m) denote the expected value from entering the CM with a portfolio m
of monies.
In the CM agents produce h units of good using h hours of labor, re-
ceive lump sum transfers, consume, and adjust their money balances. The
real wage per hour is normalized to one. Hence, the representative agent’s
problem is
W (m) = max
x,h,m+1
[U (x)− h+ βV+1 (m+1)] (5)
such that
x+ φm+1 = h+ φm + φT (6)
where the vector m+1 ≡ (m1,+1,m2,+1) is the portfolio of monies taken into
period t+1, φ ≡ (φ1, φ2) the real price of monies, and T ≡ (pi1M1,−1, pi2M2,−1)
the lump sum transfers. Eliminate h from (5) using (6) and get
W (m) = φ [m + T]
+max
x,m+1
[U (x)− x− φm+1 + βV+1 (m+1)] . (7)
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The first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to x and m+1 are
U ′ (x) = 1,
βVj,+1 (m+1) = φj
(8)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} , where the term βVj,+1 (m+1) is the marginal benefit of taking
money j out of the CM and φj is its marginal cost.
Two comments are in order here. First, the quantity of goods x consumed
by every agent is equal to the efficient level x∗, where U ′ (x∗) = 1. Second,
m+1 is independent of m. As a result, the portfolio of monies is degenerate
at the beginning of the following period. This is due to the quasi-linearity
assumption in (5), which eliminates the wealth effects on money demand in
the CM. Agents who bring too much cash into the CM spend some buying
goods, while those with too little cash sell goods.
The envelope conditions are
Wj (m) = φj (9)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} , where Wj (m) is the derivative of W (m) with respect to mj.
An agent who has a portfolio m of monies at the opening of the DM has
expected lifetime utility
V (m) = σ [u (q) +W (m− zb)]
+σ [−c (q) +W (m + zs)]
+ (1− 2σ)W (m)
where zb ≡ (z1,b, z2,b) is the amount of monies given up when a buyer and
zs ≡ (z1,s, z2,s) the amount of monies received as a seller. From linearity of
W (m) , expression (7) can be rewritten as
W (m) ≡ W (0) + φm
which can be used to rewrite the indirect utility function as follows
V (m) = W (m) + σ [u (q)− φzb] + σ [−c (q) + φzs] . (10)
Again, due to linearity of W (m), the Nash bargaining problem in the DM
reduces to
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max
q,z
[u (q)− φz]θ [−c (q) + φz]1−θ
such that
z ≤m (11)
where θ ∈ R (0, 1] is the buyer’s bargaining power, and zb = zs = z the
portfolio monies exchanged in a bilateral meeting. The constraint (11) means
that buyers cannot spend more monies z than what they bring into the DM
m. The solution to the bargaining problem is
φz = g (q) ≡ θu′(q)c(q)+(1−θ)u(q)c′(q)
θu′(q)+(1−θ)c′(q) (12)
where g (q) > 0. Assuming that buyers have all the bargaining power, i.e.
θ = 1, equation (12) reduces to φz = g (q) = c (q) . If φm ≥ c (q∗) then
the buyer exchanges z < m of his portfolio for the first best quantity q∗.
Otherwise, he gives the seller all of his portfolio, z = m, in exchange for
the quantity q that satisfies c (q) = φm. The outcome is independent of the
seller’s portfolio of monies, and it depends on m only if the constraint z ≤m
binds.
Thus, assuming θ = 1, it holds that
q (φm) =
{
q∗ if φm ≥ c (q∗)
c−1 (φm) if φm < c (q∗)
(13)
then, using the bargaining solution, the value function (10) can be rewritten
as
V (m) = W (m) + σ [u (q (m))− c (q (m))] . (14)
Now, take the differential of (14) with respect to mj for j ∈ {1, 2} and get
Vj (m) = Wj (m) + φjσ
[
u′(q)
c′(q) − 1
]
(15)
where ∂q/∂mj = φj/c
′ (q) has been used. (Notice that if (11) is binding,
then φm = g(q).)
By (15), (9), and the second condition in (8) lagged one period, the
following holds
φj,−1
β
= φj
{
1 + σ
[
u′(q)
c′(q) − 1
]}
(16)
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∀j ∈ {1, 2} . Directly from the Fisher equation, i.e. 1 + ij = (1 + r) (1 + pij)
where r = 1/β − 1, the following equilibrium condition can be written,
γj−β
β
= ij. (17)
The other equilibrium condition is
γj−β
β
= σ
[
u′(q)
c′(q) − 1
]
(18)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} , where (16) has been used.
Definition 1 A symmetric steady state monetary equilibrium with two monies
being accepted in each meeting is a couple (q, ij) satisfying (17)-(18).
At this point of the analysis the first main result can be introduced:
Proposition 1 When two monies can be used for payment in each meeting,
if they are accepted then they must grow at the same rate.
Proof. Assume that both money 1 and money 2 can be used in each meeting.
Then, (18) must hold, which implies
γ1−β
β
= γ2−β
β
or, equivalently, γ1 = γ2.
Following Proposition 1, if two monies can be used for payment in each
match, then their growth rate make all the difference. Therefore, money 1
and money 2 are symmetrically accepted if and only if they grow at the same
rate.
4 Imperfect information
Until now, it has been assumed that both monies 1 and 2 can be accepted
in decentralized meetings. In this section, this hypothesis will be relaxed by
assuming that an agent can find himself in two types j ∈ {1, 2} of meetings
in the DM: with probability α1 he is in a meeting where only money 1 can
be used for payment (type 1 meeting), while with probability α2 = 1−α1 he
can only use money 2 (type 2 meeting). This is formalized by introducing
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the assumption that agents are uninformed about the authenticity of money.
Assume that each money type can be costlessly counterfeit and that some
sellers – or each seller sometimes – cannot detect money j from counterfeits.
Also assume that counterfeits perish after they change hands. This implies
that agents will never accept the money type which authenticity cannot be
detected. For now α1 ∈ R(0, 1), and is exogenous; it will be endogenized
below.
The value function of an agent who enters the centralized market with a
portfolio m satisfies (7). The expected lifetime utility for an agent entering
the DM with a portfolio m of monies is now
V (m) = σα1 {u (q1) +W (m− z1,b)− c (q1) +W (m + z1,s)}
+σα2 {u (q2) +W (m− z2,b)− c (q2) +W (m + z2,s)}
+ (1− 2σ)W (m)
(19)
where z1,b ≡ (z1,b, 0) , z2,b ≡ (0, z2,b) , z1,s ≡ (z1,s, 0) , and z2,s ≡ (0, z2,s). The
quantities q1 and q2 denote the units of good exchanged in a meeting of type
1 and type 2, respectively. Again, these quantities will be determined by
Nash bargaining:
max
qj ,zj
[u (qj)− φjzj]θ [−c (qj) + φjzj]1−θ (20)
such that
zj ≤ mj (21)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} , where zj = zj,b = zj,s. Then, the solution to (20)-(21) is
φjzj = g (qj) ≡ θu
′(qj)c(qj)+(1−θ)u(qj)c′(qj)
θu′(qj)+(1−θ)c′(qj) . (22)
Assuming that buyers have all the bargaining power, (22) reduces to φjzj =
g (qj) = c (qj) . Again, if φjmj ≥ c(q∗j ), then the buyer exchanges zj < mj
of money j for the first best quantity q∗j . Otherwise, he gives the seller all
of his money j (i.e. zj = mj) in exchange for the quantity qj that satisfies
c (qj) = φjmj. Thus, it holds that
qj (φjmj) =
{
q∗j if φjm ≥ c(q∗j )
c−1 (φjmj) if φjmj < c(q∗j ).
(23)
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Using the bargaining solution (23) and linearity of W (m) , the value
function (19) can be rewritten as
V (m) = σα1 [u (q1 (m1))− c (q1 (m1))]
+σα2 [u (q2 (m2))− c (q2 (m2))] +W (m) . (24)
Now, take the differential of (24) with respect to mj for j ∈ {1, 2} and
get
Vj (m) = Wj (m) + σφjαj
[
u′(qj)
c′(qj)
− 1
]
(25)
where ∂qj/∂mj = φj/c
′ (qj) has been used. Again, from (9) and the second
equation in (8) lagged one period one gets
φj,−1
β
= φj
{
1 + σαj
[
u′(qj)
c′(qj)
− 1
]}
. (26)
Then, using the Fisher equation and taking the steady state of (26), equilib-
rium conditions are
γj−β
β
= ij (27)
and
γj−β
β
= σαj
[
u′(qj)
c′(qj)
− 1
]
(28)
∀j ∈ {1, 2}.
Definition 2 A symmetric steady state monetary equilibrium with imperfect
information is a couple (qj, ij) satisfying (27)-(28), j ∈ {1, 2} , for given αj.
5 Endogenous acceptability
In the previous section, the seller’s decision to accept money 1 or money 2
was exogenous. It will be now endogenized. In doing so, the assumption that
agents can accept only one money type for payment will be retained, while
the hypothesis that they are uninformed will be relaxed. Before deriving
conditions for voluntary acceptability, note that the probability that a seller
accepts money j (αj) depends on the value of money j; but the value of
money j depends on the probability that other sellers accept money j. Let
us denote this probability by αj,−s. In a symmetric equilibrium, αj must be
equal to αj,−s.
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The seller’s expected benefit of accepting money 1 in the DM is given
by the extra utility from being in a type 1 meeting, as opposed to a type 2
meeting, i.e.
∆ (α1) ≡ [g (q1 (α1))− c (q1 (α1))]− [g (q2 (α1))− c (q2 (α1))] . (29)
From the bargaining solution (22), it holds that g (qj) = c (qj) if θ = 1;
note that if the seller’s bargaining power is zero, his net benefit is zero in
each type j of meeting for any qj.
Lemma 1 θ = 1 is a sufficient condition for ∆ (α1) ≡ 0.
Proof. Assume θ = 1. Then, by (22), g (qj) = c (qj) for any j, which implies
∆ (α1) ≡ 0.
Now, assume that sellers have a strictly positive bargaining power – i.e.
θ < 1. Then, g (qj) > c (qj) holds directly from (22). So that: (i) ∆ (α1) ≡ 0
iff q1 = q2, (ii) ∆ (α1) > 0 iff q1 > q2, and (iii) ∆ (α1) < 0 iff q1 < q2. (This
is a direct consequence of the fact that θ < 1 implies g′ (q) > c′ (q) for any
q < q∗.)
To summarize, if θ < 1 and information is perfect, then there can be
three distinct equilibria (Figure 3). (i) Only money 1 is accepted : ∆ (α1) > 0
implies α1 = 1, thus all sellers accept money 1 for payment with probability 1,
and money 2 with probability 0 (top right point). In this equilibrium, nobody
brings money 2 into the DM. (ii) Only money 2 is accepted : ∆ (α1) < 0
implies α1 = 0 (bottom left point). Thus money 2 is accepted for payment
with probability 1, and money 1 with probability 0. In this equilibrium,
nobody has the incentive to carry money 1 out of the CM. (iii) Dual currency
circulation: ∆ (α1) ≡ 0 implies that sellers accept money 1 with probability
α1 ∈ R (0, 1), while they accept money 2 with probability 1−α1 (point along
the diagonal between the two).
Now, use α2 = 1− α1 into (28) and rearrange to get
α1 =
(γ1−β)
[
u′(q2)
c′(q2)
−1
]
(γ2−β)
[
u′(q1)
c′(q1)
−1
]
+(γ1−β)
[
u′(q2)
c′(q2)
−1
] . (30)
To determine α1 such that ∆ (α1) ≡ 0, use q1 = q2 into (30) and get
α1 =
γ1−β
γ1+γ2−2β . (31)
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Figure 3: Best Response Correspondence
Equation (31) determines value of α1, given γ1 and γ2, such that dual
currency circulation holds, i.e. such that sellers are indifferent between ac-
cepting the foreign money or accepting the local one.
The following Lemma can now be introduced:
Lemma 2 If θ < 1, information is perfect, and ∆(α1) ≡ 0, then α1 is
increasing in γ1 and decreasing in γ2. The opposite holds for α2.
Proof. Take the differential of (31) with respect to γ1 and γ2, and obtain
∂α1
∂γ1
= γ2−β
(γ1+γ2−2β)2 > 0
∂α1
∂γ2
= − γ1−β
(γ1+γ2−2β)2 < 0,
respectively. Using α1 = 1−α2, the inequalities ∂α2/∂γ2 > 0 and ∂α2/∂γ1 <
0 are proved along the same lines.
The next main result can be established:
Proposition 2 In a dual currency circulation economy: (i) the local money
circulates more widely than the foreign money, (ii) local and foreign monies
are symmetrically accepted if and only if they grow at the same rate.
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Proof. Assume that only one money can be used in a meeting. Also assume
θ < 1, perfect information, and ∆ (α1) ≡ 0. Then (31) must hold. By Lemma
2, this implies that: (i) α1 > α2 iff γ1 > γ2, and α1 < α2 iff γ1 < γ2, and (ii)
α1 = α2 = 1/2 iff γ1 = γ2.
The foreign money provides a better protection against the inflation tax,
but is less accepted for payment in the DM. The local money has an higher
acceptability value, but provides a less protection against the inflation. Thus,
in a dual currency circulation economy, the local money (i.e. a money with
a larger γ) should circulate more widely than a foreign money (i.e. a money
with a smaller γ). This is because sellers accept the local money for payment
more frequently than they accept the foreign one, which is necessary to induce
buyers to take the local money out of the CM. The local money provides less
protection against the inflation tax so buyers want to spend it as soon as
they can.
6 Conclusions
[To be added]
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